Felipe Bordini do Amaral

Universitat Pompeu Fabra · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Macroeconomics, Labor, Industrial Organization

Job market paper

Labor Market Power in the Presence of Informality and Self-Employment

Do informal firms and self-employment improve welfare? Although informal work and self-employment are associated with productivity losses, they also provide workers with alternatives, which can constrain employer market power of formal firms. To assess this trade-off, I build a model in which granular firms post wages and choose whether to enter and operate formally, while workers choose among formal jobs, informal jobs, and self-employment. I calibrate the model using Brazilian administrative and survey data. In equilibrium, firm informality increases welfare by 1.2%, whereas self-employment reduces it by 6.1%, when compared to a baseline without these features. A model without employer market power reverses both conclusions: informality reduces welfare, while self-employment increases it. Market power also amplifies the welfare gains from reducing taxes on formal hiring. A budget-neutral 10% payroll-tax reduction financed by higher corporate profit taxation raises welfare by 1.1%, 1.6 times the gain from the same payroll-tax cut without market power.