Mychaela Paetow

University of Southern California · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Development, Environmental & Energy

Job market paper

Market Power and the Supply of Recyclable Waste: Evidence from Indonesia’s Waste Banks

Informal recycling markets are ubiquitous in developing countries. Low state capacity for waste management creates opportunities for intermediaries to buy and sell sorted recyclable waste for profit. This paper measures the extent of market power that intermediaries have over their sellers, and what this implies for the recovery of recyclable material. Leveraging 757,559 transactions from a national network of Indonesian waste banks, I estimate the elasticity of supply for plastic facing this large buyer of recyclable waste, where I employ a shift-share IV strategy that interacts the price of virgin plastic, a substitute good for plastic waste, with each bank's predetermined plastic revenue share. I find vastly different elasticities in the two segmented markets for suppliers. Waste pickers, who collect for income, have a supply elasticity of 1.97, while households, which deliver only what their own consumption generates, do not respond to the price at all. Given this segmentation, I explore how banks respond when competition for these sellers changes, using the staggered opening of rival banks. When a rival bank opens, incumbents lose about a third of their plastic, all of it from pickers. They respond by adding finer, higher-priced grades of plastic that pickers disproportionately collect, while cutting prices on the coarse, mixed grades into which most household material falls. Competition thus raises pay for sellers who can leave and widens the markdown on those who cannot. These results matter for the design of recycling subsidies. I show that a subsidy targeted to waste pickers would cost about 30 percent less per ton of induced collection than a uniform one, and that a bank that segments its sellers through its menu delivers most of that saving on its own.