Woo-Jin Kim

University of Southern California · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Theory, Industrial Organization

Job market paper

Consumer Learning and Competitive Inefficiency

We study price competition in a differentiated-product duopoly in which a consumer observes prices before deciding whether to acquire costly information about which product fits her better. Prices shape the value of learning and, in turn, the consumer's product choice. We characterize the unique mixed-strategy pricing equilibrium in which both firms are active. In equilibrium, sufficiently large price differences override product-fit information, generating ex post inefficiency even when information is free—a distortion absent under monopoly. How this inefficiency changes with information costs depends on market asymmetry: no learning maximizes total surplus when the allocation gain from favoring the advantaged firm outweighs the matching gain from learning. Otherwise, free information is optimal. Higher information costs initially reduce learning-induced product differentiation, intensify price competition, and raise consumer surplus. Once learning ceases, however, the advantaged firm captures the market, and its market power increases as information costs rise further, lowering consumer surplus. Finally, we endogenize the information friction and show that the firm never underprovides product-fit transparency relative to the social optimum.