Yugen Chen

University of Southern California · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Industrial Organization, Health, Applied Micro

Job market paper

The Cure Can Be Worse Than the Disease: Network Design and Cost Sharing in Medicare

Pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) negotiate with pharmacies and steer patients through cost sharing. I examine how losing a potential replacement for an incumbent preferred pharmacy affects these incentives. In a bargaining model, replacement threats and copay steering are imperfect substitutes: when preferred designations adjust slowly, losing a cost-competitive nonpreferred alternative widens the dispensing-cost difference between tiers, increasing the gains from steering toward preferred pharmacies. Using 2019–2022 generic prescription data from stand-alone Medicare Part D plans, I compare local markets around closing nonpreferred pharmacies that could replace preferred incumbents with markets around eligible pharmacies that close later in an event-stacked event study design. In the first post-closure quarter, the nonpreferred-minus-preferred out-of-pocket payment gap during initial coverage increases by $3.13 per 30-day supply, approximately 42 percent of the reference gap. The preferred-minus-nonpreferred prescription-count difference also increases early. Subsequent payment-gap estimates are smaller and statistically insignificant, while preferred designations gradually change. Payment-gap responses are small during the deductible phase, following preferred pharmacy closures, and in the vertically integrated CVS/Aetna/Caremark subsample. These findings suggest that supplier alternatives shape patient price incentives and that policies expanding preferred access should account for subsequent adjustments in cost sharing.