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Optimal Taxation When Firms Can Underreport and Split
Firms can lower their taxes by underreporting their tax base and by splitting it among separately taxed entities. An authority chooses a tax schedule to raise a given revenue while minimizing firms' aggregate burden: tax payments plus manipulation costs. Firms differ in their bases and costs and choose sequences of underreports and splits. The optimal tax on each report equals the burden under the schedule that collects every reported unit, evaluated for a firm with that base and a cost cutoff chosen to meet the revenue requirement. I determine conditions under which the optimal tax under underreporting alone is unchanged when splitting is introduced. A tax designed for underreporting alone can lose almost all its intended revenue. Public registers of Slovak companies show both responses at the registration threshold of the value-added tax. Companies bunch below the threshold, and owners of unregistered companies are most likely to form a second company when the first approaches it.