Nathan Hattersley

University of Texas at Austin · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Applied Micro, Industrial Organization

Job market paper

On the Value of Sales Quotas

I investigate the power of sales targets as a vertical coordination mechanism, focusing on automotive retailing as a primary empirical example. State franchise laws preclude automobile manufacturers from most classical vertical restraints, including resale price maintenance and quantity forcing, which are important ways for the parties to control the efficiency of the retail operation and maximize bilateral surplus. For this reason, the dealership system has been viewed unfavorably by economists who malign this severe restriction on contractual arrangements between manufacturers and their dealers. I argue this critique overlooks the role of the allocation process, in which manufacturers reward dealers who meet quarterly sales targets with expanded trim assortments, a practice that despite the unfavorable regulatory landscape is de facto permitted under state franchise laws. Using the universe of Texas new-vehicle registrations from 2017–2019 and the Ford franchise network, I develop a structural dynamic model in which dealers set prices in anticipation of an expanded assortment as reward for meeting a sales target. I recover latent compliance with sales targets and the targets themselves from observed assortments, and I recover marginal costs via dealers' observed pricing policies within the dynamic game. Roughly three quarters of dealers in a given time period meet their sales target, and the dynamic incentive created by the allocation mechanism leads dealers to price below their statically profit-maximizing benchmark. Hence, I conclude that allocations act as a quantitatively important vertical restraint that has not been previously appreciated in the literature.