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Aggregative Games, Excise Taxes, and Illicit Cannabis: How Legal Regulation Fuels Illegal Markets
Despite the widespread legalization of cannabis, the illegal cannabis market remains extremely prevalent throughout the United States. This paper investigates the impact of excise taxes and legal market structure on the size of the illegal cannabis market and the entry of illegal sellers, from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. I derive a unique pricing and entry equilibrium for a multiple-leader-multiple-follower aggregative game in which legal firms act as dominant leaders, while unlicensed illegal firms act as a competitive fringe of followers. A novel structural model of supply, demand, and entry is estimated using 2014-2016 Washington State cannabis market data to measure the effect of excise taxes and legal market structure on the demand for illegal cannabis and to estimate the unobserved entry of illegal operations. Counterfactuals show that raising the excise tax increases consumer substitution to the illegal market and encourages more illegal firms to enter. Although the excise tax aims to mitigate the externality and health costs of legal cannabis use, higher rates drive consumers to the unregulated illegal market, increasing those costs and lowering total welfare. The structural results are supported by reduced-form results from a newly collected state panel of legal and illegal cannabis data.