Zitian Wang

University of Virginia · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Behavioral & Experimental, Theory, Industrial Organization

Job market paper

Search Frictions and Welfare in a Market for Prominence: Theory and Experiment

In online marketplaces, sellers pay platforms to make their products more visible and easier to inspect, creating a market for search prominence. I study how consumer search friction affects the level and distribution of surplus in this market. In the model, two sellers bid for a prominent position in a second-price auction and then post prices. The consumer observes both prices and learns her match value for the prominent seller's product for free before deciding whether to incur a search cost to inspect the non-prominent seller's product. I test the model's predictions in a laboratory experiment that exogenously varies search cost between low and high levels. I find that platform revenue is insensitive to a doubling of search cost, despite the predicted doubling of revenue. Consumer surplus exceeds predicted levels and accounts for a larger share of total surplus than predicted in both treatments. Sellers jointly retain 20–22 percent of total surplus after paying for prominence. The estimated agent quantal response equilibrium captures the observed insensitivity of bids and compressed price gap that explain these welfare findings.