Haohui Wang

University of Washington · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Industrial Organization, Theory

Job market paper

Observable Self-Restraint in Repeated Cheap Talk

A long-lived sender repeatedly advises a myopic receiver. I show how non-binding, observable self-restraint can support informative communication when the receiver observes only the recommendation record. Restrictions on message histories link current recommendations to future opportunities, inducing selective advice. Credibility rules out profitable undetectable deviations. Rolling quotas cap favorable recommendations within a moving window, allowing communication capacity to renew. With two actions, when receiver obedience requires a positive minimum sacrifice of future communication opportunities, the sender's normalized equilibrium payoff faces a ceiling strictly below the commitment payoff at every discount factor. In this case, only finitely many quota levels can support informative communication at a given discount factor. Under an upper-tail condition, the best normalized payoff from rolling quotas converges to this ceiling as the sender becomes patient. When the receiver updates beliefs after a violation, a sufficiently valuable opportunity can induce an informative on-path violation that benefits both players immediately but ends future informative communication.