Rafia Nisat

University of Washington · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Applied Micro, Development, Political Economy, Labor

Job market paper

When the Rains Fail, Does Faith Pay? Weather Shocks and the Religious Margin of Adaptation

In this paper, I test a model in which visible contributions to religious institutions insure households through reputation with village lenders rather than divine protection. Reputation is effective only when lenders are able to lend. Such contributions should therefore rise after droughts, which hit poor households while sparing their richer lenders, and fall after floods, which hit the whole village. I test these predictions using a three-wave panel from rural Bangladesh. Droughts raise poor households' contributions to mosques and temples, while time spent on early-morning religious rituals does not rise, and past donors are more likely to receive informal loans. These findings are consistent with religious giving as a way to build reputation with lenders. Contrary to the model, floods have no detectable effect on contributions.