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Development, Labor, Environmental & Energy
Job market paper
Paying to Be Paid Early: Debt Bondage in India’s Brick Kilns
India's 15 million migrant brick kiln workers take high-interest advances from their employers that bind them to the job until repaid from earnings. The interest is built into the piece rate: workers taking larger advances are paid less per brick. I measure demand for this costly form of borrowing, test what drives it, and evaluate an intervention designed to reduce it. I run a real-stakes recruitment experiment with kiln employers, advertising vacancies to 1,494 households at randomised terms that embed the interest cost. Applicants favour high advance contracts by 10 percentage points, implicitly borrowing at over 700% annually. Demand concentrates among credit constrained workers and spikes after negative income shocks, consistent with consumption smoothing. However, workers fail the required arithmetic, and three quarters wrongly believe high advance contracts pay more. In a second experiment, I make the interest explicit. It does not shift beliefs or reduce demand. This may strengthen the case for regulating advances, but a calibration shows that banning high advance contracts would hurt the poorest households, who cannot borrow elsewhere.