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Political Economy, Theory, Applied Micro, Industrial Organization, Public
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Economics of Non-Democracies: Market Power, Protests, and Regime Survival
In non-democracies, rulers can protect favored firms from competition, but the prices those firms charge can provoke protests that threaten their rule. I develop a model of this interaction between rulers, firms, and citizens to examine how the threat of protest shapes market competition and consumer prices. I show that a protected monopoly can charge less than firms in an open market, and that additional entry can raise prices. Protected firms charge below the static monopoly price to preserve future privileges, whereas unprotected firms benefit from lower extraction after political transition and restrict production to make it more likely. The protected firm nevertheless charges more than the ruler would prefer because it can continue operating after transition, whereas the ruler loses office and the benefits of power. The ruler may therefore leave the firm more rents than needed to secure its participation, strengthening its stake in incumbent survival and inducing a lower price. Sufficiently high political vulnerability, however, makes every privilege offer unacceptable to the firm. Markets can therefore open before regime change, even without deliberate liberalization by the incumbent.