Chase Wiedemann

WashU Olin · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Public, Industrial Organization, Urban & Regional

Job market paper

Coordination vs. Competition: Local Government Centralization and Metropolitan Growth

This paper examines how local government organization affects metropolitan growth. My focus is on local government centralization, or the degree to which public decision-making authority is dispersed across governments. I provide a novel measure of centralization using the distribution of local government employment across jurisdictions within U.S. metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). Because local government constitutes only part of the broader institutional framework operating in metropolitan areas, the relationship between local government organization and growth may be endogenous. To address this, I use an instrumental variables strategy based on post office closures following the introduction of Rural Free Delivery in 1902. In both the ordinary least squares and IV specifications, I find that more centralized MSAs experience greater population and private employment growth. Examining potential mechanisms that link centralization to growth, I find that centralized MSAs employ more local government workers, collect more revenue, and are less likely to host data centers, a highly tax-sensitive form of mobile capital. The findings suggest that, at the metropolitan scale, internalizing cross-jurisdictional externalities may be more important for growth than increased competition between governments.