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Industrial Organization, Econometrics, Public
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Mirrlees Vs The Masses: Optimal Income Redistribution Under a Popular Opinion Constraint
Economics is an important input into public policy, but its influence is often constrained by political feasibility. I study this constraint and measure its importance by combining text data from naturally occurring online policy debates with an online survey experiment to quantify how the general public evaluates the desirability of different income redistribution policy reforms. Public opinion is diverse and not well described by the standard Mirrleesian optimal income taxation model used by economists to study redistribution. Combining estimated policy preferences with structural estimates of Mirrlees model parameters, I find that the social planner's preferred tax reform is deeply unpopular. However, modest tweaks can achieve majority support while preserving most of the welfare gains. I verify the reliability of these results in an independent validation experiment and find that constrained Mirrleesian optimal policies achieve political feasibility while the unconstrained optimal policy does not.