Website CV Paper
Fields
Labor, Development
Job market paper
Wedding Bells or School Bells: Constraints on Marriage Timing and Women’s Educational Investments
In many developing countries, women marry young, and married women are substantially less likely to be enrolled in school than single women of the same age. This paper studies how the timing of marriage affects women's educational attainment in India. I exploit variation in marriage timing arising from the common social practice of marrying daughters in birth order. Instrumental-variables estimates imply that a one-year increase in age at marriage raises women's probability of completing high school by 5.6 percentage points. I then develop and estimate a dynamic equilibrium model in which households choose schooling and marriage timing in a directed-search marriage market. Estimates imply that although grooms prefer more educated brides, the value they place on women's education is insufficient to offset their preference for younger brides. This age penalty, along with schooling costs, a finite search horizon, and birth-order constraints, limits the gains from postponing marriage, thereby sustaining early marriage in equilibrium. I use the estimated model to evaluate an increase in the minimum legal marriage age. The policy raises schooling primarily among higher-income women but also reduces marriage rates and generates considerable welfare losses for some groups. These findings show the importance of household resources and marriage-market equilibrium responses for policies aimed at increasing women's education.