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Theory, Industrial Organization, Finance
Job market paper
Rational Search with Learning
I explore Bayes rational search for prizes (such as wages or prices) with learning. A searcher Sam is impatient and pays a cost for every search. He draws prize offers from a distribution with an uncertain mean, where observed draws constitute informative signals of the true mean via a location family with the monotone likelihood ratio property. A higher draw is myopically more inviting, but also raises expectations of better future draws. I show that a logconcave prior on the mean prize guarantees that a standard reservation rule is optimal. By contrast, in a highly uncertain environment with a heavy-tailed prior distribution, a sufficiently patient Sam accepts some prizes below those he rejects. I show that if Sam searches long enough, a reservation policy is once again optimal. With a prior over finitely many possible means, reservation policy failures arise with enough dispersion.