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Theory, Industrial Organization
Job market paper
Dangerous Talk
I explore continuous-time partnerships in an organization. Each partner has a productivity-irrelevant hidden type, either normative or rogue. An exogenous public signal process gradually reveals partners’ types to each other. The organization incentivizes calling out rogue types, but punishes false accusations. Opportunities to make an accusation or abandon the partnership arrive randomly, and are privately observed — so the partnership’s very survival is an endogenous source of information. A symmetric Markov equilibrium exists, and both types are sometimes called out if stakes are high enough. I fully solve for the unique equilibrium with one-sided incomplete information (say, a stranger entering a purely normative organization), and show how false accusations and partnership dissolutions respond to organizational incentives. In the general case with two-sided incomplete information, the equilibrium is unique when exit opportunities are sufficiently rare. Here, I characterize the equilibrium in terms of fear—exiting because of one’s reputation—and trust—collaborating regardless of one’s reputation. Lastly, I show that partnerships in this environment are assortative in the long run. This analysis offers a lens to understand the dynamics of past organizational witch hunts, such as during the Red Scare or the Lavender Scare of the 1950s.