Sabrina Ben Said

University of Wisconsin-Madison · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Macroeconomics, Finance, Labor

Job market paper

Who Bears Firm Risk? Firm Uncertainty, Employment Contract Choice, and Differential Risk Sharing

This paper studies how uncertainty shapes firms' choice between permanent and temporary employment contracts, and the allocation of risk between firms and workers. Using French administrative data, I show that firms facing greater uncertainty rely more on temporary contracts. Temporary workers are also more exposed to firm productivity shocks: their wage growth and separations respond 2.4 and 4 times more than those of permanent workers. I develop and estimate a dynamic search model with firm competition and risk-sharing contracts under two-sided limited commitment. Firing costs act as a commitment device, allowing permanent contracts to provide greater insurance but making retention and separation costly. Temporary contracts allow costless separation but provide less insurance. In the estimated model, greater firm uncertainty increases firms' reliance on temporary contracts. The aggregate effects of removing firing costs on permanent contracts hide opposing responses across firms: employment and output rise at stable firms but fall at uncertain ones. The reform reduces worker welfare and raises firm values, with both effects largest at the most uncertain firms.