Gabriel Dias Santamarina

Yale University · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Industrial Organization, Environmental & Energy, Development

Job market paper

Infrastructure Provision and Payment Evasion: Evidence from Energy Distribution in Brazil

Electricity theft and outages remain widespread even in countries with near-universal electricity access. I study how regulators can improve welfare when consumers' payment decisions respond to service quality and firms' incentives to provide quality depend on whether consumers pay. I focus on Brazil, where roughly 15% of residential electricity consumption is unpaid. Using newly assembled administrative data on consumption, nontechnical losses, outages, tariffs, and network infrastructure, I document a feedback loop between reliability and payment evasion. One additional annual interruption increases payment evasion by approximately 0.5 percentage points in lower-income areas, while a one-percentage-point increase in evasion reduces subsequent transformer replacement by approximately 3% of its mean. To quantify this mechanism, I estimate a structural model of household electricity demand and payment evasion together with firms' transformer replacement and outage restoration decisions. The model allows firms to value consumer surplus alongside profits, with observed operational decisions disciplining this weight. Counterfactuals show that eliminating payment evasion reduces outage frequency by 11.8% and raises paying households' welfare by R$5.0 per month, or 3.4% of the average bill. Allowing tariffs to vary across regions reduces payment evasion from 12.3% to 8.7% and increases consumer surplus by up to 10% in certain areas, holding the average tariff unchanged.