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Environmental & Energy, Industrial Organization, Development, Econometrics
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Dirty Trade: How Global Used Vehicle Trade Mediates Clean Transitions
Clean vehicle policies can accelerate transitions to greener economies in countries that adopt them, yet displaced used vehicles may enter the global market, with uncertain consequences for emissions and welfare abroad. This paper studies the spillover effects of Japanese Clean Energy Vehicle subsidies from 2013 to 2024 on Uganda, where around 90% of first-time registered passenger vehicles were used imports from Japan. I link Japanese subsidy schedules to data on first-time registrations, prices, and emissions of vehicles in Uganda. Exploiting variation in exposure to subsidies across different vehicles and over time, difference-in-differences estimates suggest that the subsidies decreased prices and increased the number of first-time registered vehicles. The effects were concentrated among vehicles aged 6–13 years, which were younger and generally less emissions-intensive than the average first-time registered vehicle in Uganda. To quantify the equilibrium effects of the subsidies on total emissions and welfare, I estimate a model of vehicle demand and supply in Uganda with endogenous inflows and scrappage. Simulations show that the subsidies increase total emissions, as fleet expansion outweighs the reduction in average emissions per kilometer. Nonetheless, gains in consumer surplus lead to an increase in welfare. The subsidies also change the trade-off associated with age-based import restrictions in Uganda. Tightening the import age limit from 15 to 13 years, as recently proposed, lowers total emissions at the cost of consumer surplus. Through lower prices of younger vehicles, the subsidies decrease the resulting emissions savings, as the smaller reduction in the fleet size dominates the larger reduction in average emissions per kilometer. Losses in consumer surplus also decrease, but to a lesser extent. Consequently, the tighter limit reduces welfare under the subsidies, whereas it would have increased welfare in their absence.