Michael C. Wang

Yale University · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Theory, Industrial Organization

Job market paper

A Coasian Theory of Coarse Product Lines

This paper studies a monopolist who repeatedly sells improved versions of a durable good as technology improves. The seller can condition prices on a buyer's purchase history, which is informative both about how much a buyer values quality and how large an upgrade a new version would be. However, because buyers can time their upgrades strategically, the seller offers inefficiently few options, resulting in a coarse product line. This coarseness persists even in the long run, and the seller never fully learns a buyer's value. Furthermore, the seller earns no rents from buyer heterogeneity, yet trade remains inefficient, contradicting the usual intuition that inefficiency permits the seller to retain rents. The model predicts that screening is more difficult the more frequently a buyer upgrades. As a result, product variety is concentrated among budget offerings, and product lines are coarser in industries with faster technological growth.