Nicolas Jimenez

Yale University · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Development, Industrial Organization, International

Job market paper

Quality Screening through Market Access in Public Infrastructure: Evidence from Rwanda

Governments often cannot contract on the quality of what they procure. Screening may improve performance by restricting which firms can compete, but can also weaken competition and raise prices. In repeated procurement markets, governments can screen firms based on past performance. This paper studies whether screening on past performance can mitigate the price–quality tradeoff in Rwanda's public procurement of infrastructure, focusing on a key measure of quality: project completion time. I link the near-universe of electronic procurement records for 2016–2024 to records of government payments that trace contract execution. I estimate a dynamic auction model in which low- and high-quality firms compete in first-price auctions and completed work determines access to larger contracts. High-quality firms complete projects faster and upgrade sooner, so they value the future more. Despite having higher costs, high-quality firms bid similarly to low-quality firms. I use the model to evaluate Rwanda's screening rules. Conditioning promotion on completed work lowers both spending and delays relative to random promotion. A promotion rule aimed at minimizing delays reduces spending by 15.7 percent and delays by 2.6 percent. These results show how conditioning future eligibility on past performance can mitigate the price–quality tradeoff.