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Macroeconomics, Labor
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Wage-Price Spirals: The Contract Accelerator
I study how endogenous wage indexation generates self-reinforcing wage-price spirals. Leveraging a contract-level dataset, I document that explicit indexation is more prevalent when inflation is high and volatile, while the pass-through from prices to wages is typically incomplete. I explain these patterns through risk-sharing in a general equilibrium model with endogenous indexation. The insurance value of wage indexation rises with inflation volatility. However, greater indexation transmits price increases more quickly to wages, fueling further inflation. This steepens the Phillips curve and amplifies inflation volatility. Together, these forces generate the contract accelerator: higher inflation risk encourages indexation, which in turn amplifies inflation risk and further encourages indexation. Consequently, contract choice exhibits strategic complementarity, and the economy may admit multiple self-fulfilling indexation equilibria. A more hawkish policy rule lowers inflation risk and discourages indexation. It also weakens the strategic complementarity and can ensure uniqueness. I provide empirical evidence for key model mechanisms: uncertainty encourages indexation, indexation amplifies inflation, and indexation choices are strategic complements. Quantitatively, the contract accelerator amplifies inflation by 14 percent across the 1973-75 and 1979-81 inflation spikes, relative to a fixed-indexation counterfactual. It also doubles the contribution of the post-Volcker rule to inflation stabilization during the Great Moderation.