Kai Maeda

University of York · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Industrial Organization, Applied Micro, Theory, Public

Job market paper

Participation Incentives in International Kidney Exchange: Balancedness and Regional Rationality

As international kidney exchange programs continue to expand, ensuring incentives for sustained international cooperation has become increasingly important. One widely studied incentive constraint is regional rationality, which requires that each participating country receive at least as many transplants as it could achieve through domestic exchange alone. However, verifying regional rationality requires substantial computational effort, rendering ex-post verification difficult in practice. To address this challenge, we introduce a new incentive constraint, balancedness, which requires that, for each participating country, the number of donors imported equals the number of donors exported. We show that the worst-case welfare cost of imposing balancedness is lower than that of imposing regional rationality under broad conditions and that the ratio of the worst-case welfare cost of balancedness to that of regional rationality converges to zero as the number of participating countries increases. Finally, we propose integer programming mechanisms for computing matchings that satisfy balancedness, regional rationality, or both constraints simultaneously.