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Development, Behavioral & Experimental, Theory
Job market paper
Signaling at a Loss: Experimental Evidence on Conspicuous Consumption in Tanzania
Individuals in low-income settings invest considerable resources in signals like conspicuous attire. But signaling does not always pay off. The same signal may be beneficial in some domains and disadvantageous in others. Using two experiments in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, I show that senders signal even when it backfires. In the first experiment, I establish that conspicuous attire enhances professional prestige, leaves credit approval unaffected, and reduces friendship formation and informal help. In the second experiment, senders believe wearing conspicuous attire is beneficial in every domain and give up about 60% of daily per-capita income to dress conspicuously even where it backfires. A structural decomposition attributes at least 74% of what they give up to wrong beliefs, rather than intrinsic motives. Senders appear to hold misperceptions about both which traits the signal conveys and how these traits are valued. Reducing the welfare losses from signaling requires correcting both.